Blame the Government: How State-Sponsored Inequality Made the Sahara-Sahel a Battleground
The Sahara-Sahel is home to some of the lowest-income countries on Earth. Famines are recurrent, food insecurity is widespread, and poverty is the daily bread of many individuals. Nevertheless, what has attracted international attention during the last decade is the growing power of armed groups such as Boko Haram, MNLA, and AQIM. They have managed to put states up against the ropes. They have turned this turbulent region into a conflict zone between the state and armed groups, and these latter against one another. These violent non-state actors pose a threat not only to the country but also to individuals: terrorist attacks and warfare hinder human development. And violent conflict destroys and prevents economic growth in an already impoverished area. At the same time, the Sahara-Sahel has become a vital hub for the international trafficking of drugs, weapons, and human beings.
MINUSMA Blue Helmets in Mali. Source: French Delegation to the UN
Many factors have been put forward to explain the explosion of violence in the region, from colonial borders to failed governments. However, its roots lie elsewhere. Systemic marginalization and neopatrimonialism in politics are the ones to blame. States in the region have created the perfect conditions for the flourishing of a lucrative criminal economy and armed groups' appearance. This article will analyze the horrible politics of the Sahara-Sahel and the violence and crime they have created. We will then look into the cases of some countries. We will finally explore ways to make individuals in the Sahara-Sahel more secure and freer.
States Rotting from the Inside
The first mishap of the region is the extreme inequality in the distribution of power. Elites controlling the state's apparatus, directly or indirectly, refuse to take into account the demands that would make it possible for others to attain welfare comparable to theirs. African politics are structured to a great extent through neopatrimonialism. A single authority ensures the provision of state resources to support groups through a symbiotic political relationship, which in turn allows and provides the maintenance of the authority's power (Raleigh, 2010). This kind of informal arrangement is especially prevalent in the Sahara-Sahel. Neopatrimonialism creates politically relevant and irrelevant groups, excluding certain ethnicities and peripheral populations, often coinciding with the political process, which affects the quality and duration of the lives of these groups. The relevance or irrelevance of a group depends on its physical capabilities, which determines the capacity to support or threaten an authority. The people most likely to suffer from state marginalization in the Sahel are nomads, small ethnic communities, and populations living in rural arid areas (Ibid). Irrelevant groups are marginalized from the political process and, consequently, from the public provision of goods, such as transportation infrastructure, state companies, education, or healthcare. The exclusion from the economic benefits that the state can provide is especially harmful in a region in which the private economy and private foreign investment are not especially salient.
Marginalization directly provokes a lack of economic opportunities, stable income sources, and social mobility. Less evidently, it also produces a profound feeling of humiliation, of having been left behind, of rage and resentment. The unequal geographical and ethnic distribution of state expenditure and public goods hampers economic development, freedom, and creates violence.
Survival Economics
The lack of economic and welfare infrastructure is directly linked with the emergence of a criminal economy. Engaging in illicit activities is the only way for many people to survive and acquire a fantasy of social ascension. As Nyaburi Nyadera and Massaoud put it:
"Marginalization of the communities from the formal economy of the states is the primary reason for the growth and subsequent establishment of this informal economy which has continued to draw recruitment from a majority of the young population who join to make ends meet for them and their families,"
— Nyaburi Nyadera and Massaoud, 2019, (p. 277).
Starting during the last decades of the 20th Century, the trade of illicit goods in the region began with subsidized food and oil from Libya and Algeria. When the subventions ended in the 1990s, these commercial networks shifted to other commodities, primarily narcotics and weapons. Colombian cartels began shipping their cocaine to Europe through the Sahara after losing the North American market to Mexican gangs. Moroccan hashish is nowadays sent through the Sahel into the Middle East to avoid the better controlled Maghrebian borders (Ibid). Weapon trafficking also started in the 1990s, diverting arms from conflicts in Niger or Algeria to emerging battlefields, exploding in recent years thanks to the Libyan Civil War.
Cocaine flows in the region. Source: OECD (2014). An Atlas of the Sahara-Sahel: Geography Economics and Security. OECD Publishing. Paris
The Rage of the Neglected
The loss of recognition that exclusion entails may seem less evident but is equally relevant. Exclusion cannot only be analyzed as a material fact: the meaning that individuals give to it and the particular perspective of those who suffer it must be considered. Non-recognition is humiliation, and societies can crumble if a group feels humiliated. Humiliation suppresses the question of existence. The crushed are torn between the image they have of themselves and the perception others give to them (Balzacq, 2016). It leads to the destruction of confidence in the broader social world and its security. Van Haaften and Van de Vijver, who have studied the psychological effects that marginalization produces in Sahara-Sahelian populations, put it this way:
"At the group level, established patterns of authority, civility, and welfare no longer operate; at the individual level, depression, apathy, hostility, uncertainty, identity confusion, and depression frequently emerge"
(1999, p.377).
This feeling is fertile ground for the emergence of armed actors. Marginalization has allowed groups like Boko Haram or AQIM to present themselves as the oppressed's defenders.
"The resentments and grievances towards the national governments by members of local ethnic groups in the Sahel […] have increased their vulnerability to join some of the armed groups in the region,"
— Nyaburi Byadera and Massoud, 2019 (p. 273).
These actors do more than just canalizing resentment; they also frequently provide the necessary services and welfare infrastructure that the state has not. Madrasas financed by Boko Haram and subsidiary associations have thrived in Northeastern Nigeria; these groups often offer drought relief and food aid in neglected areas.
Drought and famine in Chad. Source. Al Jazeera
The link between the criminal economy and armed groups is essential. Armed groups need the funds and weapons that illegal trade provides, and illicit activities need the instability and, often, the protection that non-state violent actors ensure. For example, cocaine shipments across the desert pay a "tax" to bands such as AQIM to pass through. Furthermore, these groups' capability to exert violence is ensured by the constant flow of weapons that illegal trade allows, which has boomed thanks to the ongoing conflict in Libya (Lacher, 2012). Neopatrimonialism divides ethnicities and areas between relevant and irrelevant, and so political and economic exclusion appears, leading to a lack of economic opportunities and a profound sense of humiliation, which provokes the emergence of a criminal economy out of pure need and of armed groups that channel the rage of these communities. The illegal economy and armed groups need and reinforce each other, resulting in increased insecurity in the region.
A Nationalist Uprising, a Jihadist Offensive And a Success Story
Mali scores are high at the Theil Index, a measure of intra-state geographical inequality that computes a score out of HDI (Human Development Index) differences among the regions of a country and at violent events.
The central most recent conflict suffered by the country is the Tuareg rebellion of 2011. The event took place mainly in the regions of Timbuktu, Gao-Kidal, and Mopti, where the Tuareg ethnicity represents the majority. These regions suffer from low HDI levels compared to the rest of the country (but for Gao-Kidal). Their HDI is 22, 1, and 29 percent less, respectively. Compared to the best-performing region, Bamako, these differences jump up to 48, 35, and 53 percent. The political status of Tuareg and Moors has switched between being powerless and junior partners, according to the GrowUp dataset. It is difficult to tell the extent to which the criminal economy is present in the area since its success depends on its invisibility.
Nevertheless, significant firearms seizures took place. The zone seems to be a vital route for the transportation of Moroccan hashish and a convergence point of two cocaine trafficking routes (Gagnol et al., 2014). The rebellion of 2011 aimed to create an independent state by the name of Azawad in this area, probably the most significant sign of dissatisfaction with the Malian state. The groups involved were mainly the MNLA and several Islamist groups. Clashes between nationalists and Islamists soon made the MNLA realign with the Malian government. Nevertheless, the conflict resulted from years of economic and political marginalization caused by the centralist state in Bamako (Nyaburi Nyadera, Massaoud, 2019).
2011 Azawad War. Source: OECD (2014). An Atlas of the Sahara-Sahel: Geography Economics and Security. OECD Publishing. Paris
Nigeria is the country with the highest score in the Theil Index in the region. Two areas are most affected: the Niger Delta and the Northeast. Focusing here on the Sahelian part of the country, that is, the Northeastern regions of Borno and Yobe, we can see that they are terrible performers. Their HDI is 31 and 56 percent less than the national average. Compared with the state with the highest value, Lagos, the difference rises to 44 and 64 percent, respectively. These regions have regressed since independence (International Crisis Group, 2015). The primary ethnicity in the zone, the Kanuri, has gone from being discriminated against to powerless, depending on the year, per the GrowUp dataset. The population of this area has suffered both from the economic and political exclusion for the last thirty years. The existence of a criminal economy can be correctly singled out thanks to major arms seizures that have been made and to the area being reported as an essential route for cocaine trafficking (Gagnol et al., 2014). It is precisely here where the group Boko Haram was created in 2002. Since then, the group has carried out thousands of attacks all around the country and has recurrently taken control of vast swathes of territory, expanded to the borderlands of Niger and Chad, and provoked a full-blown international military response. The group was founded as a school complex in Maiduguri, Borno's capital, for the poor children of the zone. They denounced state corruption and police abuses and built tens of madrasas, procuring popular support. In 2009 they started a violent campaign to transform the area into an Islamic State. Although forced to retreat in 2015 by an international coalition, their attacks have recently multiplied.
Soldiers after capturing a Boko Haram (ISIS) flag. Source: Público
Contrasting with the previous examples, the case of Morocco shows that armed violence does not necessarily exist in the region. A reasonably peaceful country when compared to its neighbors, its levels of HDI inequality are negligible, the difference between the worst-performing area and the average is of only 4 percent. It is true, however, that Sahrawis remain politically discriminated in the country. Nevertheless, the lack of economic exclusion seems to offset the political exclusion effect. Although Morocco suffered from a conflict with the Sahrawi Polisario Front, a violent group, in the late 80s, data shows that there has been a significant reduction of the differential between Western Sahara and the rest of the country, thanks to positive tax discrimination, justifying the absence of new major violent events.
A Way Forward
The traditional response to domestic violence has usually been more policing and expensive military operations, destroying the already precarious economies of the region and producing even more resentment. Another way is possible. To put an end to the illicit economy, states should ensure alternative sources of income, an equal distribution of public goods, and a real commitment to equal opportunities. A legal economy is beneficial to local populations and state authorities since it provokes the emergence of taxable activities and liberates resources from the security forces. The response necessarily goes through the impartial provision of public services and economic investments. Indeed, these neglected areas are often arid and isolated places where the emergence of high value-added activities is difficult, which is why states should consider putting in place favorable discrimination policies and exploiting the strategic location they have for the flourishing of legal regional and world trade.
"Governments can claim that their inability to provide much-needed resources and social welfare in all parts of the country is caused by the weak economy […] however, the point is not about whether there is a strong economy or not but whether national resources are shared in a manner that promotes inclusivity and equity,"
— Nyaburi Nyadera and Massaoud, 2019.
Furthermore, foreign powers should diversify their interventions in the region, providing economic relief and investment projects to the most neglected areas apart from pure military force. Of course, the financial exclusion is not caused by a naiveté of state authorities, but rather from the neopatrimonialism political arrangements from which they profit. Political exclusion is behind most of the cases of subnational economic inequality. Again, European countries and the EU have a role to play here by conditioning military support to create more politically inclusive societies. Foreign powers have to ensure that the response to violence is not only military and that conflicts do not merely end with the state winning but with all parties arriving at satisfactory arrangements. The inclusion of Tuareg rebels into Malian security forces after the 2011 war is an excellent example. Equality, not power, is the way towards a more peaceful and freer region.
References
Balzacq, T. (2016). Théories de la sécurité. Les approches critiques. Paris: Presses de Sciences Po.
Gagnol, L., Bensâad, A., Antil, A., Augé, B., Heinrigs, P., Nwajiaku-Dahou, K., . . . Walther, O. J. (2014). An Atlas of the Sahara Sahel: Geography, Economics and Security OECD Publishing..
International Crisis Group. (2015). The Central Sahel: A Perfect Sandstorm. International Crisis Group. Retrieved from http://gateway.proquest.com/openurl?url_ver=Z39.88-2004&res_dat=xri:policyfile&rft_dat=xri:policyfile:article:00177768
Lacher, W. (2012). Organized Crime and Conflict in the Sahara Sahel Region. Washington: The Carnegie Papers.
Nyaburi Nyadera, I., & Massaoud, M. H. (2019). Elusive Peace and the Impact of Ungoverned Space in the Sahel Conflict. Güvenlik Bilimleri Dergisi, 8(2), 271-288.
Raleigh, C. (2010). Political Marginalization, Climate Change, and Conflict in African Sahel States. International Studies Review, 12(1), 69-86.
Van Haaften, E. H., & Van de Vijver, F. J. R. (1999). Dealing with extreme environmental degradation: Stress and marginalization of Sahel dwellers. Social Psychiatry and Psychiatric Epidemiology, 34(7), 376-382.
Edited by Hiba Arrame
The Many Challenges of North Africa: Understanding the Algerian Role in Regional Security
On Monday, the 23rd of December 2019, the news agency Algeria Press Service released a press dispatch announcing the sudden death from a heart attack of the de facto leader of Algeria, Ahmed Gaid Salah. Only four days before, the newly elected but highly contested President of the People’s Democratic Republic of Algeria, Adbelmajid Tebboune took office and, as a first measure, decorated Gaid Salah - the Chief of Staff of the People’s National Army - with the top honour of the National Order of Merit. The Lieutenant that ruled over Algeria saw in Mr. Tebboune, ‘the man able to lead Algeria to a better future’. This tragic event illustrates the seemingly new regime that claims to put an end to the military rule over the country. Between wills of change and political dramas, what is the Algerians’ place in regional governance? What are the strategic challenges that the North African power and its new regime will have to face in the pursuit of regional peace and stability?
Algeria and the Many Challenges of North Africa
Strategically located on the Mediterranean coastline, holding the highest Human Development Index of continental Africa and covering the largest national area in both Africa and the Arab World, Algeria has imposed itself as an unavoidable security actor in North Africa. The 2019 mass protests put all eyes back on this keystone country, as a part of the process of maintaining international peace and security in this unstable region. The challenges that the North African power has to face are of various natures, ranging from coping with the Malian and Libyan crises to controlling upcoming migrations from the Sahel region towards Europe, and tackling terrorism. In addition, the democratic challenge that has been gathering millions of Algerian each Friday of the last eight months makes the balance of powers in the region even more unstable.
In order to provide a panoramic understanding of the dynamics of Algeria in regional security, this article will first critically assess the military and political profile of the country before examining the Algerian involvement in matters of conflict-solving and counterterrorism in North Africa, with a special emphasis put on the ongoing Malian crisis. Finally, a brief thought on the possible future scenarios regarding security problems at stake in the region such as migrations in the prism of Algerian politics will be then proposed to the reader. Under no circumstances does this work attempt to achieve anything but to neutrally describe the situation in this country. It does not constitute a position in favor of any cause or point of view.
Wielding the Carrot and the Stick: A Heavily-Armed but Rethinkable Regime
Just like Soviet countries back in the Cold War, Algeria enjoys a heavy military that concentrates all the efforts on the political power at the cost of public investments in public health, education or even energetic transition. Salient is the fact that of all arms imported by African states, 54% account for Algeria alone, well ahead of its Morroccan neighbour and Nigeria. Relying on the most important proven reserves of oil in North Africa, Algeria has chosen to dedicate 5.7% of its annual GDP to military expenditures.
The regime entertains strong and long-term military partnerships with playmakers of the international security scene. Algeria ranks among the top destinations of the Russian Federation’s military exports, third only to India and China. As of March 2019, 66% of all weapons imported in the North African country are fabricated in the Eurasian power, Stockholm International Peace Research Institute reports. In addition to the privileged Russian partnership that dates back to the Cold War, China, Italy as well as Germany are also important suppliers of the Algerian military.
Many claims among the Algerian population have emerged during recent years and partly explain the 2019 mass protests. Last July, the French-speaking daily newspaper El Watan (meaning ‘the Homeland’ in Arabic) published an article entitled ‘Democracy in Algeria: End of Privileges with a Corrupted Regime’. According to the widely-read newspaper and other analysts, the role of the military is prevalent in the country and should be reduced. To a relative extent, bearing in mind all the frustrations that could be addressed towards the government, one must acknowledge the fact that press independence is more or less preserved in the country, as shows the critical stance of popular newspapers. Regarding the involvement of citizens in politics, many analysts underscore the process of ‘depoliticisation of the citizenry’ (1). It is worth highlighting that during recent years, the government has shown some signs of good will, taking into account popular requests. Examples include the February 2016 long-awaited constitutional recognition of Berber as an official language of the People’s Democratic Republic of Algeria alongside with Arabic; or the creation, by the executive power, of two commissions dedicated to ensuring a democratic control of elections: National Commission for Election Supervision and the Independent National Commission for the Surveillance of Legislative Elections (2), which effectiveness can be questioned.
Conveyed by social media and direct talks between citizens, the 2019 protests demonstrate a more active role of the population that first of all aims to reshape the democratic system in a more comprehensive and inclusive framework. In other words, Algerians seem to be driven by a will to experiment with a new form of democracy on behalf of representativeness in the two senses of the term: that is, to be both the reflection and the voice of the population.
Protesters in Algiers, unhappy with the political system. June 14, 2019 (Reuters/Ramzi Boudina (source)
A North African Power Involved in Regional Security and Conflict Resolution: the Malian Example
Following the neoliberal methodology of International Relations, foreign policy making is for a great part driven by domestic politics and norms (3). As such, this section will try to understand through the Malian conflict how the Algerian deciders shape the nature of the policy on regional security and terrorism.
Since 1962, and as a result of the war against colonialism, the Algerian foreign policy has relied on two essential principles: non-interfering in other countries’ domestic politics and using military force only to protect borders while preferring negotiations to solve conflicts (4). One would remind the pivotal role of Algerian diplomacy during the Cold War as shown by the solving of the Tehran hostage crisis with the 1981 Algiers Accords, which Point I was entitled ‘Non-Intervention In Iranian Affairs’ (5). One should also bear in mind the importance of the Cold War in the understanding of the two mantras, to the extent that this period and its global dynamics contributed to building the fundamentals of the Algerian diplomacy. The US-Iranian example illustrates the foreign policy leitmotiv of the country: that is, to act as a mediator and to support non-meddling in domestic affairs of foreign powers while refusing military intervention.
The conflict in Mali has to be analysed in order to understand the contemporary offshoot of this diplomatic tradition. Algeria has been endorsing the role of ‘the Leader of Mediation’ (‘Chef de file de la Médiation’) (6) between the Government of Mali and the Azawad separatist movement. In accordance to the role of mediator that the Berber country likes to endorse, a ceasefire between the two camps has been agreed upon and signed in the Mediterranean capital in 2015 (7), in what is now also known as the Algiers Accords. The agreement called for the respect of national sovereignty and peaceful dialogue in Mali. Moreover, in the matter of dealing with cross borders terrorism, Algeria also opts for bilateral cooperation. That is why a Mali-Algeria summit is held frequently, either in Bamako or Algiers in order to provide a comprehensive framework of cooperation in intelligence and counterterrorism in the Sahara desert. Likewise, the Comité d’Etat-major Opérationnel Conjoint (CEMOC), based in the southern city of Tamanrasset, aimed to secure a deserted area expanding to Mali, Mauritania and Niger. But with the France-led Operation Barkhane, this initiative became somewhat secondary and quite ineffective.
Although idealist, as any accord, the 2015 Algiers Accords as well as multilateral initiatives illustrate the Algerian paradox: even if the country has the military ability to intervene and could have the legitimacy to do so, it elected not to. However, it should be reminded that Algeria enjoys a high-class secret service and counterterrorism section of the military, that have proven since the end of a decade-long fight with the now defeated Islamist insurgency - but also the 9/11 attacks, its effectiveness when operating against terrorism within the national borders (8). As such, in November 2019 in the region of Ghardaia, Algerian Defence Ministry arrested a group of eight Islamist militants planning to join terrorist groups in Mali (9).
Algeria of Today, Algeria of Tomorrow: What’s Next, Except Uncertainty?
The Algerian strategic potential is merely unmatched in the world. Should it be because of its geography - Algeria is a pivotal crossing point for trade and migrations; the richness of its cultural heritage - that is the meeting of every Mediterranean civilisation; the unity of its people; the resources of its subsoil. But years of mismanagement as well as the infamous ‘lost decade’ of the 1990s have jeopardised the growth and openness of this regional power. Among the reasons for the non-take-off of the Algerian economy is the lack of diversification. Indeed, around 95% of Algeria’s exports originate from petroleum, making the national economy vulnerable to low oil prices, and more largely to international context, despite a low level of debt. Algeria has to diversify its economy and exports in order to resist an external shock and establish a stable growth. Economic fields such as tourism and tertiary sectors have to be developed by the political power.
Algeria’s exports are almost only composed by hydrocarbures. The country needs to diversify its economy (source: The Observatory of Economic Complexity) (source)
Regarding regional affairs, some auspicious signs can be observed. Albeit distrustful towards the regime, the Algerian population is still showing support to the military and the diplomatic role of its representatives. The Malian example along with the Libyan crisis, tend to demonstrate that Algeria’s commitment for dialogue remains constant. An unanswered question subsists however. Is Algeria ready to cope with the overwhelming upcoming migrations flows coming from Sahel and Sub Saharan Africa? How will Europe manage to convince Maghreb countries - of which Algeria is the largest - to anticipate the decade to come?
Finally, an Algerian revival cannot ignore the demands of the 2019 protests. The refusal of a fifth presidential mandate of Mr Bouteflika is first of all a call for democracy and transparency. Algerians do not necessarily reject the former Cold-War icon but rather the institutional system as a whole, which is widely considered as sclerotic and corrupted. Despite auspicious signs for democracy, the proposals emanating from the government remain unsatisfying for the population. The regime needs to seriously take into consideration the will for democracy and the right to dignity and act accordingly in order to achieve social peace. If not, who knows if the country is ready to face political division and social partition, so deeply needed in this period? Things might look somewhat gloomy but let us daydream when watching all the population united under the Desert Foxes winning the African Football Cup. As put by a young Algerian supporter in Paris ‘unity is possible in Algeria and nothing is impossible for Algerians.’ Hopefully, the future will prove the optimistic young man right.
The victorious Algerian football squad contributed to maintain a national unity amidst tense political context in 2019. (source)
References:
1. Yahia H. Zoubir & Ahmed Aghrout, Algeria: Reforms Without Change? in Zoubir, Yahia H & White Gregory, eds., North African Politics: Change And Continuity, (London: Routledge, 2016), p. 146.
3. Helen V. Milner, Interests, Institutions, and Information: Domestic Politics and International Relations (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1997).
4. Akram Belkaïd, ‘Pourquoi l’Algérie n’intervient-elle pas militairement en Libye et dans le Sahel ?’ in L’Algérie, Un Pays Empêché, (Paris: Tallandier, 2019), p. 298.
8. Kal Ben Khalid, ‘Evolving Approaches in Algerian Security Cooperation’, Combating Terrorism Center Sentinel, Vol. 8, Issue 6, June 2015.
Edited by Hiba Arrame